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KAI HAFEZ
RÉSUMÉ / ABSTRACT
Cet article se propose d’analyser à la fois les avancées et les revers 
de la sphère publique égyptienne sur la base de la théorie des systèmes 
médiatiques comparés et de la théorie de la transformation. Le fait que 
les nouveaux dirigeants militaires aient introduit une censure sévère 
prouve que les médias sont susceptibles de manipulation politique. 
Cependant, les raisons de la régression du système médiatique égyp-
tien sont multiples. Les médias, largement concentrés entre les mains de 
vieilles élites, ont fait pression contre la transformation démocratique. 
Pendant la transition du ‘printemps arabe’, des médias et des publics 
radicalement polarisés ont miné les bases du consensus démocratique et 
des sphères publiques pluralistes. La profession journalistique ainsi que 
les publics peuvent être considérés comme coresponsables du retourne-
ment autoritaire de la sphère publique qui a suivi le coup d’état militaire.
MOTS CLÉS :
Médias de masse, Sphère Publique, Journalisme, Systèmes média-
tiques, Approche comparative, Communication Politique.
This paper seeks to analyze both the achievements and the failures 
of the Egyptian public sphere on the basis of the theory of comparative 
media systems and transformation theory. The fact that new military 
rulers introduced harsh censorship is proof that media are vulnerable to 
political manipulation. However, the reasons for the regression of the 
Egyptian media system are manifold. Media capital, largely concentra-
ted in the hands of old elites, exerted pressure against the democratic 
transformation. During the Arab Spring transition radically polarized 
media and audiences did not enable the creation of democratic consen-
sus and pluralist public spheres. The journalistic profession as well as 
audiences can be considered co-responsible for the neo-authoritarian 
downswing of the public sphere that followed the military coup.
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KAI HAFEZ
RADICALLY POLARIZED PUBLIC AND THE 
DEMISE OF MEDIA FREEDOM IN EGYPT
D emocracy needs a public sphere. There are various theories in that ield. One of the most famous is by Jürgen Habermas, who suggested that through rational deliberation among citizens, and between citizens 
and the state, modern societies interact and solve problems.1 Legitimacy 
in democracies is not only guaranteed by elections, but citizens should 
participate in the public sphere and support elected politicians.
Media freedom is a prerequisite of that process, as it enables 
public discourse. The core elements of any democracy therefore are: 
free elections, free gathering of people, human rights standards, and 
freedom of opinion and of the media.
However, there are many problems with this argument. Habermas 
himself called them the “structural changes” of the ideal public sphere. 
The mass media play a crucial role as mediators among citizens, but have 
no democratic mandate and very often act as agents of special political 
or capitalist interests. Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky call this 
the “manufacturing of consent”.2 Neo-Marxist theoreticians like Antonio 
Gramsci complained about hegemony in the public sphere.3Feminists 
criticized Habermas for his naïve belief in a rational public which is, as 
they think, in fact very emotional. Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau 
suggest the decentralization of the public sphere through the Internet as 
a necessary ingredient to post-democratic communication. They speak 
of multiple small, rather than one integrated, national public sphere.4
1. Habermas, 1989. 
2. Herman and Chomsky, 1988.
3. Gramsci, 1971.
4. Laclau et Mouffe, 2001. 
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What has all this to do with Egypt? Egypt is certainly not a post-
democratic state; it is not even a democratic state. The “Arab Spring” 
and a series of elections over the last two years have made it look 
like one, but electoral democracy has never been fully achieved and 
consolidated. First, there was a parliament without a president then a 
president without a parliament – and since the military coup in July 
2013 there has been neither an elected president nor a parliament. 
President Morsi was toppled and the Muslim Brotherhood banned. 
With regards to media freedom the situation is much worse than under 
Mubarak, who at least granted some form of liberal autocracy with a 
certain amount of critique even of the government. The military coup 
seems more like a counter revolution and a Nasser-style roll-back 
to hard-handed media policies. The popular “Tamarud” movement 
against Morsi was used by old elites, and the “deep state” that was left 
over from Mubarak to get back to power. The future will show whether 
democracy still has a chance in Egypt. 
This is sad, because two years earlier a historic real social movement 
had toppled a dictatorship in Egypt. The social movement was the 
missing link which brought together secularists, Islamists and various 
social forces, each of which was too weak to overthrow the regime 
alone. We have to recall a situation that seems almost absurd today: 
in February and March 2011 people from all segments of society, 
secularists, Salaists and Muslim Brothers, demonstrated side by side on 
Tahrir Square and in the rest of the country. The Arab Spring in Egypt was 
not a “Facebook Revolution”, but it was partly enabled by new media 
like the web 2.0 and transnational TV networks such as Al-Jazeera, 
which broadcasted live 24 hours a day about the revolution. The public 
sphere was certainly not limited to electronic media, because non-
mediated oral communication on the streets played an important role.
How can we understand that a pluralistic public sphere such as 
that in 2011 and 2012 collapsed into what we are witnessing today? 
Formerly critical TV networks like CBS, Dream TV, Al-Nahar TV, Tahrir 
TV, Mehwar, Sada El Balad, QahiraWalNas or ONTV are all broadcasting 
the SCAF version of events, and the same is more or less true for the 
newspapers. After the coup against Morsi, a “ighting terrorism” badge 
was aired on TV screens to show that the Muslim Brotherhood was 
a “terrorist organization”. Massacres perpetrated by the military on 
the supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood were belittled, and attacks 
on churches dominated the news although Muslim Brotherhood 
protests against SCAF were predominantly peaceful. Since the coup, 
the political line of the state media’s coverage has turned around 180 
degrees: once they were behind Mubarak, then supported Morsi, now 
they wholeheartedly support the military leadership. SCAF closed down 
the Islamist media and introduced much stricter censorship than during 
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the Morsi period. International journalism associations and media are – 
perhaps for the irst time in history – more critical than supportive of the 
coup against an Islamist government. At least, it seems that the almost 
unanimous support of military coups against Islamists, as in the case of 
the Algerian election 1190/91, has waned.5
To understand the Egyptian development we have to analyze the 
deep structural patterns of the Egyptian media system. International 
comparisons are helpful because what happens in Egypt – the 
disintegration of a previously vivid public sphere – is not new in 
democratic transformations. The vulnerability of young democracies 
is an almost universal feature in world history. Well-known media 
scholars Daniel Hallin und Paolo Mancini have identiied four relevant 
dimensions for media comparison in democracies: the relations 
between state and media, civil society and media, economy and media, 
and between the journalistic profession and media.6 These dimensions 
cover most aspects of systems theory and the interactions of media with 
other sub-systems, like the political and economic system, or more 
dispersed and less organized system environments “civil society”. The 
question in democracies is not only how much freedom the state leaves 
to the media, but also if media contribute to social, economic and 
professional development.
Of course, Hallin and Mancini’s typology was made for European 
and North American media systems. The question is: To what extent 
such models can travel to, for example, the Arab world? Some have 
complained that the inluence of religion has been neglected.7 This is 
somewhat true, since “Islam” plays a much more vital role in modern 
Arab politics than religion does in most Western countries. At the same 
time it would be wrong to presuppose an essential difference between 
Western and Middle Eastern countries due to the existence of Islam. 
Arab and Egyptian experiences are not completely sealed off from 
Western developments.8 For example, in the United States the First 
Amendment of the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of opinion 
and of the media, has been frequently restricted on religious grounds.9 
Hallin and Mancini also made clear that religion played a decisive role 
in European media history because it was the competition between 
Catholics and Protestants more than anything else that triggered the 
spread of the printed word, of papers and pamphlets. When utilizing 
5. Hafez, 1996.
6. Hallin and Mancini, 2004. 
7. Khamis, 2009. 
8. Hafez, 2010. 
9. Heins, 1993. 
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Hallin and Mancini, therefore, I will try and walk a rational mid-path 
between essentialism and Eurocentrism, applying their basic media 
typology but, at the same time, considering religion and other factors 
that might be characteristic of the present Egyptian situation.
EGYPTIAN MEDIA AND THE STATE 
Over the last sixty years and since the revolution of 1952, Egypt has 
experienced a clear long-term trend towards increased media freedom 
from the presidency of Gamal Abd al-Nasser to the military coup of July 
2013. The late years of Husni Mubarak can by and large be labeled as a 
“liberal autocracy”, in which it was possible to criticize the government 
although many red lines were not to be crossed.
During the Egyptian Arab Spring of 2011 private media like ONTV, 
Dream TV or the newspaper Al-Masry Al-Youm supported the popular 
uprising, as did transnational media like the Qatari network Al-Jazeera. 
Media freedom in 2011 reached an all-time high in Egypt. But when the 
interim SCAF-government took over in 2011, the problems started anew. 
The military acted against several journalists, and grafiti critical of the 
military were erased. However, the dualism between state controlled 
media and critical private media prevailed. More than twenty new TV 
channels were opened. Nile TV, ONTV, Al-Tahrir TV, Al-Nahar TV or 
Masr25 reported about police brutality or the massacre in the football 
stadium of Port Said.
The main characteristic of the era of President Mohammed Morsi 
was the stagnation of media freedom. His government did not so 
much introduce new hardships into the media system, the freedoms 
of the private media persisted. Although many Islamist media opened 
up there was no clear trend towards illiberal Islamization during his 
reign. Even so Morsi also did nothing to abolish restrictive media laws 
that were left over from the Mubarak regime, and while private media 
enjoyed great freedoms, there was no reform of the state media sector. 
Hallin and Mancini had made clear that despite the fact that Europe 
has large public media sectors most of them are not state controlled but 
autonomous and inluenced by various civil society forces. As early as 
2011 UNESCO demanded not only the abolition of restrictive media 
laws and licensing systems, but also a reform of the Egyptian state 
media into a public media sector.10During the reign of Morsi, Egyptian 
media advisors worked out concrete plans for such a transformation 
and proposed them to the government, but such plans were never put 
10. Assessment of Media Development in Egypt. Based on UNESCO’s 
Media Development Indicators, UNESCO, Cairo 2011.
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into practice. Instead, Morsi kept the state media irmly under control 
and used them as a bulwark against the often critical private media.
The constitution Morsi introduced by referendum in November 
2012 left many questions regarding the media sector unresolved. The 
constitution, which by then had been abolished, guaranteed freedom of 
the press as long as “national security”, cases of “public mobilization” 
or insults to religious prophets of Islam, Judaism and Christianity did 
not make censorship necessary (Art. 47 and 48).11Membership of the 
regulatory authority, called the National Media Council, remained 
unclear, quite like the status of media licenses, in particular, because 
they were only given to those who accepted the “values and traditions 
of society“ (Art. 215) – a passage that was open to interpretation and 
government censorship. Although the constitution was not an Islamist 
constitution in the sense of creating an Islamist dictatorship as in Iran, 
media regulations were unclear. However, rather than abolishing it, 
one could have amended the Morsi constitution, as was done several 
times in countries as diverse as the United States and Indonesia.
Despite the deicits of his constitution, Morsi’s rule was not so much 
a time of active Islamization of the media sector but of stagnation of 
media structures. But then came the military coup of July 2013. SCAF 
shut down all Islamist media thus ending the phase of pluralism in 
the Egyptian media system. Ofices of Al-Jazeera and of the Turkish 
Radio and Television Corporation were closed because they had 
had reported on Muslim Brotherhood protesters. Military censorship 
returned, many journalists were killed and more than one hundred of 
them imprisoned. Observers speak of a broad coordination between 
SCAF and private media in Egypt.12 The military coup brought a roll-
back from semi-liberal democracy to illiberal autocracy of a Nasserist 
type. Even the criticism of the political leadership that was there under 
the late Mubarak – not to speak of the widespread freedom that existed 
under Morsi – has been re-transformed into a state reminiscent of what 
William Rugh once called the “mobilizational” media of the Nasser 
era,13 only that the SCAF in 2013 rallied against what they considered 
the Islamist “terrorists” of the Muslim Brotherhood and elected President 
Morsi and not for Arab socialism.
11. Egypt’s Draft Constitution Translated, http://www.egyptindependent.
com/print/1278681.
12. Kirkpatrick, 18 August 2013. 
13. Rugh, 2004. 
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MEDIA AND CIVIL SOCIETY
According to Hallin and Mancini, the basic problem in the 
relationship between the media and civil society is whether the media 
tend towards liberal “centrism” or “political parallelism”. In young 
democracies the media often show close afiliations with political 
parties and other forces of civil society. The question, however, remains 
whether they are able cover all relevant opinions in Egyptian society or 
merely represent a small elitist bias.
The irst two and a half years after the Arab Spring revolution were 
characterized by sharp political antagonism within the public sphere 
or by what one could call “radical polarization”. Egyptian media 
were “pluralist” in the sense that they represented clear-cut political 
viewpoints, but also “radical” because they often denied any legitimacy 
to the “other” camp. The most decisive cleavage existed between pro- 
and anti-Morsi- or anti-Brotherhood media. 
The pro-Morsi-media, for example the TV channels Masr 25, al-
Rahma, al-Hafez, al-Nas, al-Khalijiya, were extremely one-sided in 
their coverage. More than once they spread, for instance, rumors against 
those protesters who demonstrated against the Morsi constitution, 
arguing that they were drunk and many other things. Islamist media at 
the time of Morsi were often sectarian and propagandist in style. Viewers 
sometimes became afraid of rapid Islamization, especially because the 
state media were also Morsi controlled. However, anti-Morsi media 
did not really perform better than that. Al-Tahrir newspaper, like many 
others, showed a irm anti-Muslim Brotherhood-orientation: a fact that 
was even criticized by journalists within the paper itself, but which 
never led to more internal pluralism.14 Only very few media such as 
Al-Masry Al-Youm could claim to be somehow “centrist”.
Moreover, there was and is a strong tendency towards 
boulevardization and “politainment“ in the Egyptian media. The 
mass media sometimes used new freedoms for the extreme bashing 
of politicians, as demonstrated for example through the treatment and 
scandalizing of Mohammed el-Baradei and his daughter. Although 
solid content analysis is still missing, one is certainly not wrong when 
arguing that both content and the tone of many media outlets were not 
directed towards compromise or consensus, which are the core of the 
Habermasian rational public sphere, or what Hallin and Mancini call 
the liberal centrist media. Egyptian media were rather reminiscent of 
14. I am indebted to my PhD-candidate Nadia Leihs for this information. 
She did numerous interviews in Egyptian newsrooms. 
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the Weimar Republic in Germany between the two World Wars, with 
its radical public debates between uncompromising political forces 
of ultra-nationalists, communists and Fascists leaving no room for a 
constructive support of the elected parliament and the democratization 
of institutions. The young German democracy was as overburdened 
as the Egyptian public; many people even enjoyed radical freedom of 
opinion after decades of authoritarian constraint.
From a theoretical point of view there were and are other problems 
with the Egyptian media, one being the extreme centralization of the 
media in the Cairo area. While theoreticians like Hallin and Mancini 
take it for granted that regional decentralization has been the backbone 
of democratic Western media systems for centuries, Egypt, like many 
other developing societies, suffers from a severe concentration in and 
around the capital city. As a result, regional problems, peasants, workers, 
the South and other peripheral interests are often ill-represented. Such 
problems can also be observed in other Muslim countries, just to 
mention the example of Indonesia with its enormous concentration of 
capital and media outlets in the Jakarta area. 
To sum up, the public mood before and during the Morsi era was 
characterized by structural problems such as the radical polarization 
of the public sphere, a lack of internal pluralism of most media and 
insuficient integration of peripheral perspectives within civil society. 
Such patterns might not be too daring from the point of view of public 
sphere theories like that of Mouffe and Laclau, who argue against the 
idea of national integrated public spheres. For them, liberal centralism 
enabled through big mass media represents an extreme form of 
gatekeeping and mainstreaming of voices and interests. However, 
Mouffe and Laclau did not think of young democracies like that of Egypt, 
which are intrinsically instable and for which the national integration 
of discourse is direly needed in order to transform and rebuild national 
institutions. 
Habermas seems to it much better here – or is the Internet a viable 
alternative to mass media?
During the Arab Spring, the Egyptian Internet became strongly 
politicized. Even before the revolution, Egypt was the center of Arab 
blogging. However, the Egyptian uprising against Mubarak was not a 
“Facebook revolution”.15 Only ten percent of the Egyptians used such 
tools, and after a few days of the upheaval in late January 2011, the 
Internet was shut down by the government. The argument that the closure 
of the Internet somewhat triggered increased protests might be correct, 
15. Lynch, 2011. 
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but the slogan the “Facebook revolution” surely reduces the credit other 
media – like Al-Jazeera – or non-mediated political communication on 
the streets deserve. After the initial revolution and up to today the Internet 
has certainly provided a back-up for news deicits in the mass media. 
And in times of re-enhanced censorship by the military the Internet has 
become all the more important for any kind of opposition. 
Since the military coup of July 2013, political polarization, but also 
the type of pluralism that comes along with it, has come to an end. 
We have witnessed a roll-back towards Nasser-style authoritarian and 
mobilizational media. Islamist media have been closed and the existing 
media show a synchronicity of coverage that reaches deeply into the 
details. The authorities exert enormous pressure and most public voices 
have joined a hyper-nationalist chorus against the Muslim Brotherhood. 
SCAF critics are treated as traitors. Even media that supported the 
Tamarud-protests are expected to protest against such un-democratic 
forms of media repression, but they do not and/or cannot. The previous 
radical polarization had not yet developed inter-group tolerance, but 
it was at least critical of the government and acted as a “4th power”. 
Before the military coup, Egypt’s media system was comparable to 
Hallin and Mancini’s “Mediterranean Model” of democratic media 
with a strong government sector and a very polarized private media 
sector. Nowadays, it can no longer be considered a democratic system 
– it is authoritarian in nature.
The question arises to what extent the radical polarization of the 
Egyptian media in the Morsi era was at least partly responsible for the 
heated public climate that paved the way for the military intervention. 
The Egyptian case reveals that it is not enough to point to the emergence 
of the Arab public sphere16, the ‘Arab street’17 and somewhat idealize the 
struggles of Arab civil societies against the authoritarian state. It seems 
high time to relect the deicits of Egypt’s political culture, the inability 
of many secular as well as Islamist media to understand that “Freedom 
is always the freedom of the one who thinks differently”, as the famous 
German communist Rosa Luxemburg once said. Radical polarization of 
public spheres in young democracies might be a historically widespread 
phenomenon – but it is also part of the puzzle of why the consolidation 
of democratic transformation is often such a painful long-term process. 
The most successful form of democratic transformation is not revolution 
but “negotiated system change”18 among previously radical political 
forces who actively create a new consensus.
16. Eickelman and Anderson, 1999.
17. Lynch, 2006. 
18. Merkel, 1999. 
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MEDIA AND ECONOMY
One of the biggest problems of democratic consolidation is the 
concentration of media capital. Unlike in many Latin American 
countries, the state media sector in most Arab countries is still huge. At 
the beginning of the Arab Spring events, UNESCO described Egyptian 
private media as rather diverse in terms ownership.19
However, there are increasing trends towards media concentration 
and no effective controls against that. Ownership concentration has 
spurred the downswing of pluralism in Egyptian media. For example, 
Ibrahim Eissa had to sell Al-Tahrir TV to Suleiman Amer, a businessman 
closely connected to the Mubarak network and to the old authoritarian 
elite.20
One of the major structural patterns of the Egyptian media system 
is that the extreme inequality of capital distribution in Egyptian society 
was not at all affected and changed by the revolution. It is certainly 
true that even big and old democracies like the United States show 
the traits of extreme concentration. Most major US media are linked 
through ownership structures and boards of trustees to big business in 
the United States and this poses a serious challenge to media freedom. 
The ideal type “liberal media” that Hallin and Mancini talk of do not 
exist. However, when comparing Egypt to the United States, one must 
note that not all capital in the US is “loyalist” in the sense that it can 
be identiied with a particular political player. US media capital is 
somewhat more competitive, and political parties, social institutions 
and civil society at large are less vulnerable than in Egypt. 
After decades of authoritarian rule and a inancial “deep state” 
still organized around networks that existed in the neo-patrimonial 
Egyptian state, capitalist deregulation of the Egyptian media system 
is a questionable strategy. It would certainly be wiser to opt for dual 
systems like those in Europe. A reformed public media sector, whose 
independence and linkage to civil society must be constitutionally 
guaranteed, should act side by side with private capitalist and 
independent alternative media. 
MEDIA AND THE JOURNALISTIC PROFESSION
The professional development of journalism is important for 
democratic media and the public sphere. Without professional and 
19. Assessment (UNESCO), op.cit.
20. Sakr, 2013. 
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ethical training, quality enhancement and adequate moderation of 
public debates cannot be expected. Moreover, internal journalistic 
freedom in newsrooms and professional ethical self-regulation through 
journalism syndicates or trade unions are important elements of 
independent journalism. 
The Egyptian Press Syndicate was long dominated by the Mubarak 
regime. In recent years it has witnessed a power struggle between pro 
and anti-Muslim Brotherhood forces. As a result it has never been able 
to fully free itself from state interference. Although at several points in 
history the Syndicate protected journalists, but it is said to have also 
tolerated corruption. One of the major problems in the ield of self-
regulation is the lasting prohibition of free trade unions as these are not 
sheltered under the umbrella of the Syndicate. The forced membership 
of journalists is against the principles of the free association which, as 
was mentioned above, is among the core aspects of any democracy. 
In its current form, journalistic self-regulation is by and large a form of 
hidden censorship. 
Internal media freedom in newsrooms is another pending issue in 
Egypt. After the revolution many journalists protested against newspaper 
editors. Some were even made to step down, others stayed in ofice. 
Some media installed real newsroom conferences and enhanced the 
internal media dialogue. But the strict editorial and political lines of 
many editors remained mostly intact.
The social situation is what makes most journalists vulnerable to 
editorial and political pressure and even prone to corruption. Except for 
hot shots in the media business, most journalists in the private media 
sector are ill-paid. Many journalists try acquire jobs in the better paying 
state media. For most journalists there is no clear regulations governing 
salaries, holidays or other working conditions. Without better job 
security, no improvement in the quality of journalism can be expected. 
CONCLUSION
Before the military coup in July 2013 one could have argued 
that Egypt was a a rather immature and radically polarized but vivid 
public sphere. After the coup, however, it seems that the country has 
witnessed an authoritarian roll-back reminiscent of Nasserist times. 
The famous media scholar and political intellectual Noam Chomsky 
criticized the military coup in Egypt. One can and must be critical 
of the Muslim Brotherhood, he said, but their President Morsi was 
legitimately elected, and the military, in his eyes, is not aiming to 
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stabilize democracy but seeks control over power and the economy.21 
Once again it seems true that the mass media are hardly ever the avant-
garde of democratization because they are simply too vulnerable to 
political or inancial manipulation.22
However, the media and journalists are also responsible for the 
current situation. The heated and radically polarized public opinion 
during the Morsi era and the deep gulf between Islamist and oppositional 
media, with their strong group biases and afiliations, often projected the 
image of what a Lebanese political scientist once called a “democracy 
without democrats”.23 Egyptian public opinion, once united in an anti-
authoritarian movement against Mubarak, left the consensus behind 
and rallied behind antagonizing camps each with maximalist political 
options. It seems as if the ground rules of democracy were ignored. 
While Islamists disrespected the secular equality of religions before the 
law, their opponents showed contempt for elections and the peoples’ 
vote whenever that turned out to favor Islamist parties, parliaments and 
presidents. 
It seems high time for media studies of the Arab world to analyze 
both the beneits and the failures of Arab public spheres more 
thoroughly. The structural patterns of state, economy, civil society and 
professional journalism are all part of the puzzle. Meanwhile the Arab 
communication revolution has come to a stand-still and explains why 
reform is direly needed in all spheres.
21. Chomsky, 17 October 2013. 
22. McConnel and Becker, 2002. 
23. Salamé, 1994. 
